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Marketing and Antitrust in Japan
JOHN 0. HALEY
Associate Professor of Law
University of Washington
The Japanese marketing system is commonly described as an
acutely inefficient network of small wholesalers and retailers, costly
to consumers and discriminatory in its bias against imported goods.1
Indeed the failure of retail prices for imports to reflect the rising
value of the yen since August, 1971 and the reportedly poor perform-
ance by foreign sellers in penetrating the Japanese market are prob-
lems increasingly attributed to the Japanese system of distribution. 2
Population density and limited space require consumers to make
daily purchases of immediate needs and force merchants to main-
tain only the barest inventories. As a result, Japan has nearly two
times as many retail stores and wholesale outlets per capita as the
United States.3 Most are "mom and pop" stores. In 1976, for exam-
ple, 85 percent of all retail stores and 46 percent of all wholesale
outlets had less than five employees.4
Although retail and wholesale establishments have continued
to increase in number,' since the early 1960's there have been ex-
1. Aside from journalistic accounts, there are remarkably few detailed studies of the
Japanese distribution system in English. The best scholarly work remains M.Y. YOSHINO, THE
JAPANESE MARKETING SYSTEM (1971). Others worth noting include: DISTRmUTION ECONOMICS
INsrrTrU oF JAPAN, OUTLINE OF JAPANESE DISTRIBUTION STRUcruREs (1971); JAPAN EXTERNAL
TRADE ORGANIZATION, PLANNING FOR DISTRIBUTION IN JAPAN (n.d.c. 1972). All emphasize the
complex fragmentation of the Japanese marketing system and recent changes toward greater
manufacturer control. One of the best recent Japanese studies is Got5, Ryiitsii keiretsuka to
shijo keizai (Channelization of Distribution and Market Economics), in RYUtTsii KEIRETSUKA
TO DOKKIN HO (Channelization of Distribution and the Antimonopoly law) 9-40 (M. Matsush-
ita ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as GotS].
As to the problems foreign manufacturers face in penetrating the Japanese market, see
D. F. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN 33-34, 146 (1974).
2. See, e.g., Remarks by Kazuo Nukazawa, in United States - Japan Trade Council,
Council Report No. 14, March 22, 1977, p. 3. A recent Ministry of International Trade and
Industry report takes exception to this view. MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
WHrrE PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 86-89 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 WHITE PAPER
ON INTERNATIOANL TRADE]. But the report notes that the normal margin allowed importers
exceeds that for similar domestic products or imports into other countries. Id. at 87.
3. See statistics cited in Got6, supra note 1, at 11; 1978 WHITE PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE, supra note 2, at 88.
4. 1978 WHrITE PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 2, at 88.
5. GotZ, supra note 1, at 17.
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panding efforts toward manufacturer control and reorganization of
distribution channels. Exclusive dealings arrangements, territorial
restrictions, manufacturer-dominated retail associations and fran-
chises have become increasingly common.' Because of the inefficien-
cies of the present distribution structure and consequent cost to
consumers, many observers have viewed the trend toward greater
manufacturer control in channelling distribution of their products
and the resulting rationalization of traditional patterns of market-
ing as both necessary and beneficial.7 Apparently, however, such
views are not shared by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (FTC)
and its staff. In a recent series of cases, the FTC has adopted a strict
illegality approach and held one of the more typical manufacturer-
imposed market channelling arrangements to constitute an unfair
business practice in violation of article 19 of the Japanese Antimon-
opoly and Fair Trade Law.' The purpose of this article is to assess
these cases and their implications in the context of Japanese anti-
trust regulation of marketing.
Marketing Restrictions as Unfair Business Practices
For purposes of Japanese antitrust policy, most manufacturer-
imposed marketing restrictions are regulated solely under the article
19 proscription of unfair business practices.' The alternative is arti-
cle 3, which prohibits "private monopolization" and "unreasonable
restraints of trade" as defined in articles 2(5)10 and (6).1 Although
6. Id. at 22.
7. See, e.g., YosHiNo, supra note 1, at 124-28. According to Yoshino, the traditional
market system has developed three identifiable patterns of distribution: distribution through
outlets owned by the manufacturer, through manufacturer-controlled franchises, or through
a group of affiliated wholesalers and retailers. However, there is little functional difference
between use of a franchise or other means of affiliation. Consequently, it is probably more
accurate to say that there are two basic patterns,
8. Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kosei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru haritsu (Law
concerning the prohibition of private monopolization and the maintenance of fair trade), Law
No. 54 (1947) as amended 2 EHS KA 3 [hereinafter referred to as the Antimonopoly and Fair
Trade Law]. Article 19 provides: "No entrepreneur shall employ unfair business practices."
9. As noted at p.57 infra, although the prohibition of article 19 is broad enough to control
international transactions, it is used primarily to prevent unfair business practices employed
by individual entrepreneurs in domestic transactions.
10. Article 2(5) provides:
"The term 'private monopolization' as used in this law means such business
activities, by which any entrepreneur, individually, or by combination or conspir-
acy with other entrepreneurs, or in any other manner, excludes or controls the
business activities of other entrepreneurs, thereby causing, contrary to the public
interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade."
[English translation, not identical, available in 2 EHS KA 2, 5].
11. Article 2(6) provides:
[Vol. 2
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vertical restraints could be condemned under United States law as
"unreasonable restraints of trade," the Japanese FTC has adhered
to an early Tokyo High Court decision in which the phrase
"concerted activities" of article 4 (deleted in 1953) was construed
to apply only to horizontal restraints. 12 The court's construction is
thought to apply to the definition of "unreasonable restraints of
trade" in article 2(6).
1
3
There is also the Noda Shoyu case" in which resale price main-
tenance was attacked as "private monopolization" under article 3
on the theory that when in an oligopolistic industry the consumer
identifies quality with price, vertical price-fixing by the leading firm
is tantamount to controlling the pricing of other manufacturers who
wish to maintain the reputation of equivalent products. Carried to
its logical conclusion, Noda Shoyu would have been guilty of private
monopolization any time it changed its prices. Despite the accept-
ance of this bizarre argument by the Tokyo High Court on appeal,15
this case has no sequel and is best considered an aberration.
Reliance on the prohibition against unfair business practices as
the primary antitrust mechanism to police marketing and other
vertical restraints gives rise to a number of problems, however. Not
the least of these stem from the ambiguities of the definition of
unfair business practices in article 2(9) and related FTC regula-
tions.
The term "unfair business practice" (fuk-osei na torihiki hbh6),
employed at present, dates from the 1953 amendments."5 To consti-
"The term 'unreasonable restraint of trade' as used in this law means such
business activities, by which entrepreneurs by contract, agreement or any other
concerted activities, mutually restrict or conduct their business activities in such a
manner as to fix, maintain, or enhance prices, or to limit production, technology,
products, facilities, or customers or suppliers, thereby causing, contrary to public
interest, substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade."
[English translation available in 2 EHS KA 2, 3].
12. K.K. Asahi Shimbunsha v. K6sei Torihiki (Fair Trade Comm'n) [hereinafter cited
as FTC], 4 Kosrs Tommxi INKAI SHmNKrSUSHU [hereinafter cited as Shinketsushi], 145
(Tokyo High Ct., Mar. 9, 1953). The implication to the contrary in Tsuji, Regulation of Resale
Price Maintenance in Japan, 18 N.Y.L. FORUM 397 n. 3 (1972) is incorrect, presumably the
result of editorial error. Also, most of the examples cited by Tsuji involved resale price
maintenance by trade associations and other instances of horizontal price-fixing.
13. See, e.g., A. SHODA, CARTEL TO HORITSU (Cartels and Law) 27 (1968).
14. In re Noda Shbyu K.K., 7 Shinketsushii 108 (FTC [Decision] Docket No. 2, 1954,
Dec. 27, 1955).
15. Noda Shbyu K.K. v. FTC, 9 Shinketsush-i 57, (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 25, 1957). The
Tokyo High Court suggested that the extent of consumer identification of price with quality
might be unique to the Japanese soy sauce industry, thus permitting easy distinction of the
case.
16. As enacted in 1947, article 19 referred to "unfair methods of competition" (fukusei
na ky~so h~hj), following the language of section 5 of the United States Federal Trade
No. 1]
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tute an unfair business practice as defined currently in article 2(9),
conduct must come within one of the following six categories:
1. Unduly discriminating against other entrepreneurs;
2. Dealing at undue prices;
3. Unreasonably inducing or coercing customers of a competitor
to deal with oneself;
4. Trading with another party on conditions as will restrict un-
justly the business activities of said party;
5. Dealing with another party by unwarranted use of one's bar-
gaining position;
6. Unjustly interfering with a transaction between an entrepre-
neur who competes in Japan with oneself or with the company of
which oneself is a stockholder or an officer and his customers; or
in case such entrepreneur is a company unjustly inducing instiga-
tive or coercive means on stockholders against the interest of such
a company or an officer of such company to act.
In addition, however, the conduct must have been designated in
advance by the FTC as an unfair business practice and "endanger
fair competition." Pursuant to this definition, in 1953 the FTC is-
sued its General Designation of Unfair Business Practices.'" The
Commission Act. The definition in old article 2(6) set out six specific types of conduct that,
if not justified as reasonable, came within the prohibition.
"The term 'unfair methods of competition,' as used in this Law, shall mean such
methods of competition which come under any one of the following items:
(1) Unwarranted refusal to receive from or to supply to other entrepreneurs
commodities, funds and other economic benefits.
(2) Supplying of commodities, funds and other economic benefits at unduly
discriminative prices;
(3) Supplying of commodities, funds and other economic benefits at unduly
low prices;
(4) Inducing or coercing unreasonably customers of a competitor to deal with
oneself by means of offering benefits or that of threatening disadvantages;
(5) Trading with another party on condition that said party shall, without
good cause, refuse acceptance of supply of commodities, funds and other economic
benefits from a competitor of oneself;
(6) Supplying commodities, funds and other economic benefits to another
party on such conditions that shall unduly restrain transactions between said party
and his suppliers of commodities, funds and other economic benefits or customers
or that shall unduly restrain relations between said party and his competitors, or
on condition that the appointment of officers (hereinafter referring to directors,
unlimited partners who are executives, auditors or persons similar thereto, manager
or chief of the main or branch office) of the company of said party shall be subject
to prior approval on part of oneself."
Subparagraph (vii) provided for the inclusion of other practices which were found to be
"contrary to the public interest" and designated by the FTC under rulemaking powers in
articles 71 and 72.
17. In addition to the General Designation, the FTC has designated unfair business
practices in eleven specific industries. These include: the Specific Designation of Unfair
[Vol. 2
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General Designation lists twelve unfair business practices in equally
broad terms.
(1) Unduly refusing or limiting deliveries from certain entre-
preneurs or to supply to certain other entrepreneurs, commodities,
funds, or other kinds of economic benefit.
(2) Affording without good reason, substantially favorable or
unfavorable treatment to certain entrepreneurs in regard to the
terms or execution of transactions.
(3) Excluding specific entrepreneurs from concerted activi-
ties or from a trade association, or unduly discriminating against
specific entrepreneurs in the concerted activities of the trade asso-
ciation, thereby causing to such entrepreneurs undue disadvantage
with respect to their business activities.
(4) Supplying or receiving, without good reason, commodi-
ties, funds, or other kinds of economic benefit at prices which
discriminate between customers in different places or between cus-
tomers.
(5) Supplying commodities, funds, or other kinds of eco-
nomic benefit at unreasonably low prices or receiving them at un-
reasonably high prices.
(6) Inducing or coercing, directly or indirectly, customers of
a competitor to deal with oneself by offering undue advantages or
threatening undue disadvantages in the light of normal business
practices.
(7) Dealing with customers on condition that they shall,
without good reason, not supply commodities, funds, or other
kinds of economic benefit to, or not receive commodities, funds, or
other kinds of economic benefit from a competitor of oneself.
Business Practices in the Miso Industry (FTC Notification No. 13, 1953), Specific Regulation
of Unfair Business Practices in the Sauce Industry (FTC Notification No. 15, 1953), Specific
Designation of Unfair Business Practices in the Rubber Footwear Industry (FTC Notification
No. 1, 1954), Specific Designation of Unfair Business Practices in the Department Store
Industry (FTC Notification No. 7, 1954), Specific Designation of Unfair Business Practices
in the Margarine and Shortening Industry (FTC Notification No. 1, 1956), Specific Designa-
tion of Unfair Business Practices in the Match Industry (FTC Notification No. 2, 1956),
Specific Designation of Unfair Business Practices in the Textbook Industry (FTC Notification
No. 5, 1956), Specific Designation of Unfair Business Practices in the Marine Transportation
Industries (FTC Notification No. 17, 1959), Specific Designation of Unfair Business Practices
in the Animal, Whale Meat, etc., Canning Industry (FTC Notification No. 1, 1961), Specific
Designation of Unfair Business Practices in the Can and Bottle Industry. (FTC Notification
No. 12, 1961), Specific Designation of Unfair Business Practices in the Newspaper Industry
(FTC Notification No. 3, 1964).
The FTC has also issued two sets of guidelines listing restrictions that "risk" being
deemed unfair business practices in international contracts prohibited under article 6(1);
Guidelines for International Licensing Agreements (FTC, May 24, 1968) and Guidelines for
Sole Import Distributorship Agreements (FTC, November 21, 1972).
There have been only seven formal decisions under the specific designations and one
under the guidelines. See Tables 1 and 2.
No. 11
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(8) Dealing with customers on conditions, which, without
good reason, restrict any transaction between the said customers
and the supplier of commodities, funds, or other kinds of economic
benefit to them or between the said customers and any person
receiving those from them, or any relationship between the said
customers and their competitors.
(9) Dealing with a company on condition, without good rea-
son, that the appointment of officers of that company (meaning
those as defined by subsection (3) of Section 2 of the Act concern-
ing Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair
Trade) shall be subject to prior direction or approval by oneself.
(10) Trading with customers on conditions which are unduly
unfavorable in light of normal business practices by making use of
one's predominant position over the said customers.
(11) Unjustly interfering with a transaction between other
entrepreneurs who compete in Japan with oneself or with the com-
pany of which oneself is a stockholder or an officer and their party
to such transaction by preventing the execution of a contract, or
by inducing breach of contract, or by any other means whatsoever.
(12) Unjustly inducing, abetting, or coercing a stockholder or
an officer of a company which competes in Japan with oneself or
a company of which oneself is a stockholder or an officer, to act
against the interest of such company by the exercise of voting
rights, transfer of stock, divulgence of secrets, or any other means
whatsoever.
The language of both the statute and the General Designation
has obvious breadth and ambiguity. Almost any conceivable verti-
cal (or other) restraint is potentially subject to FTC challenge as an
unfair business practice. Yet enforcement of article 19 has been
sporadic at best (see Table 3). Between 1947 and 1976, the FTC, the
sole enforcement agency, decided only 113 cases involving unfair
business practices (see tables 1 and 2). Of these, 32 involved trade
associations under article 8(1)8 and 23 international contracts
18. Article 8(1) provides:
"No trade association shall engage in any one of the following acts:
(i) Substantially restricting competition in any particular field of trade:
(ii) Entering into an international agreement or an international contract as
provided for in Section 6(1);
(iii) Limiting the present or future number of entrepreneurs in any particular
field of business;
(iv) Unduly restricting the functions or activities of the constituent entrepre-
neurs (meaning an entrepreneur who is a member of the trade accociation herein-
after the same);
(v) Causing entrepreneurs to do such acts as constitute unfair business prac-
tices."
[English translation in 2 EHS KA 8].
[Vol. 2
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under article 6.11 Of a total 31 decisions between 1947 and 1953, in
only 9 cases were domestic transactions challenged. Since 1953,
there have been only 42 decisions involving unfair business practices
by individual entrepreneurs in domestic transactions.
Table 1
Formal FTC Actions Involving Unfair Methods of Competition
1947-1953
Challenged Conduct Under Article 2 (6) *
(domestic
transactions)
Article 19 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)




22 cases 3 0 0 0 21 2 0
31 cases total 3 0 0 3 24 6 0
*Several cases involved more than one unfair method of competition.
One must not confuse, of course, the number of formal FTC
actions with the number of actual cases the Commission handles.
Most cases are resolved through the ubiquitous process of adminis-
trative guidance and negotiated settlement and generally do not
find their way into the statistics. An exception has been the FTC
reports on international contracts, which do provide some data on
the volume of cases the FTC resolves without formal decision. From
1970 to 1976, for instance, the Commission reviewed 31,889 interna-
tional contracts under article 6. In 1,934 of these cases, some form
of "guidance" was given.20 But during the entire period from 1953
to the present there has been only one formal decision under article
19. Article 6(1) provides:
"No entrepreneur shall enter into an international agreement or an international
contract which contains such matters as constitute unreasonable restraint of trade
or unfair business practices."
[English translation in 2 EHS KA 6].
20. The FTC reports on international agreements as reprinted each year in the April or
May issue of K~sei Torihiki (Fair Trade).
No. 1]
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Table 2
Formal FTC Actions Involving Unfair Business Practices
1953-1976
Challenged Conduct Under General Designation
Article 19 Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
42 cases 4 1 1 0 0 7 10 21 2 3 5 0
Article 6
1 case 1 1
Article 8 (1)
32 cases 23 3 0 0 0 0 2 8 0 0 0 0
75 cases total** 27 4 1 0 0 7 13 30 2 3 5 0
*Several cases involved more than one unfair business practice.
**One case was decided under article 19 relating to the Specific Designation of
Unfair Business Practices in the Marine Transportation Industry (FTC Noti-
fication No. 17, 1959) and six cases were decided under the Specific Designation
of Unfair Business Practices in Textbook Industry (FTC Notification No. 51,
1956).
6.21 However useful administrative guidance may be to the particu-
lar parties and their attorneys in providing an understanding of how
the staff officials of the FTC construe the antimonopoly statute and
Commission's designations, it does not substitute for formal deci-
sions as a means for public clarification of the Commission's views.
One is therefore left with the task of piecing together odd fragments
of possible policy by examining a few isolated cases.
The Commission has assailed a variety of restrictions and prac-
tices. In terms of formal actions, by far the most numerous have
involved resale price maintenance schemes,22 followed by exclusive
21. In re Amano Seiyaku K.K., 16 Shinketsushr 134 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 22,
1969, Jan. 12, 1970). This case illustrates the pitfalls of relying on any of the article 6 cases
(as well as recommendation decisions) in evaluating what conduct the FTC considers an
unfair business practice. Amano filed with the FTC a license agreement entered with Novo
Industri A/S, a Danish firm, a few days before its termination. The FTC charged-and
Amano readily agreed-that the contract contained several unfair business practices,-not
the least of which was a post-termination noncompetition clause. The decision followed
ordering Amano to delete the provision. Although not a party, Novo Industri attempted an
appeal but lost for lack of standing. Novo Industri A/S v. FTC, 29 Minshfl 1592 (Sup. Ct.,
3d P.B., Nov. 28, 1975), aff'g 17 Shinketsushu 297 (Tokyo High Ct., May 19, 1971). [English
translation in 16 JAPANSE ANN. INT'L L. 97 (1972)].
22. In re K.K. Hakugen, 23 Shintetsushfu - (FTC [Recommendation] No. 19, 1976,
Oct. 8, 1976); In re Gunze K.K., 23 Shinketsush-u - (FTC [Recommendation] No. 3, 1976,
[Vol. 2
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Table 3
Formal FTC Actions Involving Article 19 and Unfair Business
Practices Under the General Designation Between 1953 and 1977

























June 14, 1976); In re France Bed K.K., 22 Shinketsushi 127 (FTC [Recommendation] No.
2, 1976, Feb. 20, 1976); In re Pijon K.K., 22 Shinketsushii 115 (FTC [Recommendation] No.
33, 1975, Jan. 7, 1976); In re Mut5 K6gy5 K.K., 21 Shinketsushi 148 (FTC
[Recommendation] No. 44, 1974, Nov. 22, 1974); In re Nihon K6gaku K-gy5 K.K., 19
Shinketsushii 25 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 7, 1972, June 30, 1972); In re Matsushita
Denki Sangyo K.K., 17 Shinketsush-i 187 (FTC [Decision] No. 4, 1967, Mar. 12, 1971); In
re Otsuka Seiyaku K.K., 16 Shinketsushil 1 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 9, 1969, April 14,
1969); In re Wak5d5 K.K., 15 Shinketsushii 84 (FTC [Decision] No. 2, 1966, Oct. 11, 1968),
aff'd on First Appeal (jokoku), Wakod5 K.K. v. FTC, 18 Shinketsush- 214 (Tokyo High Ct.,
July 17, 1971), affd on Second Appeal (jbkoku) 29 Minshi 888 (Sup. Ct. 1st P.B., July 10,
1975); In re Morinaga Shoji K.K., 15 Shinketsushu 84 (FTC [Decision] No. 2, 1966, Oct.
11, 1968; In re Meiji Sh~ji K.K., 15 Shinketsushfi 67 (FTC [Decision] No. 1, 1966, Oct. 11,
1968), aff'd on First Appeal, (k~koku) Meiji Sh5ji K.K. v. FTC, 18 Shinketsusha 167 (Tokyo
High Ct., July 17, 1971), affd on Second Appeal (j5koku), 29 Minshu- 951 (Sup. Ct. 2d P.B.,
July 11, 1975); In re Calpis Shokuhin K~gy5 K.K., 15 Shinketsushi 72 (FTC
[Recommendation] No. 5, 1967, Aug. 14, 1967); In re Olympus K~gaku K~gy- K.K., 14
ShinketsushU 41 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 13, 1966, Oct. 3, 1966; In re Asahi Keito
No. 1]
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dealing arrangements.' Other practices the Commission has suc-
cessfully challenged include belo w cost sales and other pricing prac-
tices,24 discounts and other special benefits to customers and deal-
ers,2s refusals to deal,26 and pyramid sales.27 These cases are gener-
ally bereft of analysis. In lieu of a carefully developed rationale, one
finds a bald application of the statute to a minimal finding of facts.
Absent also, are cases on several practices, such as territorial restric-
tions and tying arrangements, condemned or at least seriously ques-
tioned by most Japanese authorities.?
Nor can one look to the courts. Through 1976 there have been
reported appeals from only fifteen FTC cases.9 Of these, only seven
K.K., 13 Shinketsush-i 75 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 20, 1965, Oct. 5, 1965); In re K.K.
Yakult Honsha, 13 Shinketsushii 72 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 19, 1965, Sept. 13, 1965;
In re Kao Sekken K.K., 13 Shinketsushri 14 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 6, 1965, May 20,
1965).
23. In re France Bed K.K., 22 Shinketsushil 127 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 2, 1976,
Feb. 20, 1976); In re Pijon K.K., 22 Shinketsushi 115 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 33, 1975,
Jan. 7, 1976); In re Mut5 K6gyB K.K., 21 Shinketsushi 148 (FTC [Recommendation] No.
44, 1974, Nov. 22, 1974); In re Zenkoku Hambi N~gy5 Ky~d'o S~go Rengkai, 12 Shinketsushi
39 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 11, 1963, Dec. 4, 1963); In re Kumamotowo K.K., 10
Shinketsushi 17 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 1, 1960, February 9, 1960); In re Taisb
Seiyaku K.K., 7 Shinketsushii 99 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 3, 1955, Dec. 10, 1955); In
re K.K. Hokkaid5 Shimbunsha, 5 Shinketsushi 5 (FTC [Decision] No. 9, 1951, May 18,
1953), aff'd on First Appeal (ko-koku), K.K. Hakkaid5 Shimbunsha v. FTC, 6 Shinketsushi
89 (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 23, 1954), aff'd on Second Appeal (jkoku) 15 Minshii 116 (Sup.
Ct. 1st P.B., Jan. 26, 1961); In re Taish5 Seiyaku, 4 Shinketsushu- 119 (FTC [Decision] No.
1, 1952, Mar. 28, 1952); In re Chikya Rayon Hamigaki K.K., 4 Shinketsush 106 (FTC
[Decision] No. 6, 1952, Mar. 7, 1953); In re Nihon Kbgaku K~gy5 K.K., 4 Shinketsushii 30
(FTC [Decision] No. 55, 1950, Sept. 3, 1952); In re Marukin Sh~yu K.K., 1 Shinketsushu
129 (FTC [Decision] No. 19, 1949, Mar. 20, 1950).
24. See, e.g., FTC v. K.K. Chilbu Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 28 K5sai minshl6 174 (Tokyo
High Ct., April 30, 1975), granting preliminary injunction against below-cost sales of newspa-
pers. One of the arresting aspects of this case is the court's acceptance of the FTC's construc-
tion of the costs of the defendant, a local subsidiary of a major daily newspaper, based on
presumptions of what its costs would have been if independent.
25. See, e.g., In re Taish5 Seiyaku K.K., 7 Shinketsush-i 99 (FTC [Recommendation]
No. 3, 1955, Dec. 10, 1955) (rebates to dealers who agreed to promote Taish products, i.e.,
pharmaceuticals); In re K.K. Osaka Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 7 Shinketsushi 96 (FTC
[Decision] No. 1, 1955, Dec. 8, 1955 (cash prizes and gifts to dealers); In re K.K. Hokkoku
Shimbunsha, 6 Shinketsushfi 13 (FTC [Decision] No. 3, 1954, Dec. 17, 1954 (advertising
discounts to movie houses that did not advertise in competing papers).
26. See, e.g., In re Nihon Suisan K.K., 12 Shinketsushfi 746 (FTC [Recommendation]
No. 14, 1964, Nov. 7, 1964) (refusal to supply wholesalers unless they promised not to sell
product to large cooperatives).
27. In re Holiday Magic K.K., 22 ShinketsushUi 11 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 16,
1975, June 13, 1975).
28. See, e.g., Matsushita, Regulation of Sole Import Distribution Agreements Under the
Japanese Antimonopoly Act, 18 JAPAN ANN. INT'L L. 66, 71-73 (1974).
29. Novo Industri A/S v. FTC, 29 Minshii 1592, (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., Nov. 28, 1975)
[English translation in 16 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 97 (1972)]; Zenkoku Kinzoku Rd5 Kumiai
v. FTC, 17 Shinketsushi 221 (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 12, 1970) (third party appeal of Yawata-
[Vol. 2
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reached the Supreme Court, three of which were third party appeals
dismissed for lack of standing." In adddtion, only three damage
actions have been decided in the entire thirty-year history of the
Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law in Japan.3 1 As yet there has been
no satisfactory explanation of this'dearth of appeals.
One therefore approaches analysis of any area of Japanese anti-
trust law-and particularly the problem of marketing restric-
tions-with considerable caution. There are simply too few cases
and too little doctrinal development.
Notwithstanding the uncertainties inherent in Japanese regula-
Fuji steel merger decision); Meiji Shoji K.K. v. FTC, 18 ShinketsushU 167 (Tokyo High Ct.,
July 17, 1971), aff'd on second appeal (j5koku), 29 Minsh-i 951 (Sup. Ct. 2d P.B. July 11,
1975); Wak-do K.K. v. FTC, 15 Shinketsushui 84 (FTC [Decision] No. 2, 1966, Oct. 11, 1968,
aff'd on First Appeal, (kokoku), WakSd5 K.K. v. FTC, 18 ShinketsushUi 214 (Tokyo High
Ct., July 17, 1971), aff'd on Second Appeal (jkoku) 29 Minsh-5 888 (Sup. Ct. 1st P.B., July
10, 1975); Tabu Tetsud6 K.K. v. FTC, 11 Shinketsush-u 146 (Tokyo High Ct., May 5, 1962);
Yoshikawa v. FTC, 10 Shinketsushi 91 (Tokyo High Ct., Nov. 24, 1958) (third party appeal
of decision against Mitsubishi Bank); Noda Shoyui K.K. v. FTC, 9 Shinketsush7, 57 (Tokyo
High Ct., Dec. 25, 1957); Nihon Sekiyu K.K. v. FTC, 8 Shinketsush7 65 (Tokyo High Ct.,
Feb. 9, 1956); K.K. Osaka Yomiuri Shimbunsha v. FTC, 7 Shinketsush-i 169 (Nov. 5, 1955);
T5h5 K.K. v. FTC, 5 Shinketsush7 118 (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 7, 1953) [summarized in
English in GUIDE To LEGISLATION ON RESTRmcTI BuseNEsS PRAcTIcEs, supra, at 3.1-3-4]. K.K.
Hokkaid5 Shimbunsha v. FTC, 6 Shinketsushfi 89 (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 23, 1954), aff'd on
Second Appeal (jkoku), 15 Minshb 116 (Sup. Ct. 1st P.B., Jan. 26, 1961); Nippon Shuppan
Ky5kai v. FTC, 5 Shinketsush-u 88 (Tokyo High Ct., Aug. 29, 1953); K.K. Asahi Shimbunsha
v. FTC, 4 Shinketsushu- 145 (Tokyo High Ct., Mar. 9, 1953); Osaka S~g Shokuhin K.K. v.
FTC, 3 Shinketsushii 196 (Tokyo High Ct., Nov. 30, 1951); Toh5 K.K. v. FTC, 3 Shinketsu-
shU 166 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 19, 1951) [summarized in English in Guide to Legislation on
Restrictive Business Practices, vol. IV, B.-1-2 (OECD 1977)].
30. Novo Industri A/S v. FTC, 29 Minsh-i 1592 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., Nov. 28, 1975) (third
party appeal); Zenksoku Kinsoku R~d5 Kumiai v. FTC, 19 ShinketsushUi 231 (Mar. 1, 1973)
(third party appeal of Yawata-Fuji merger decision; Waked5 K.K. v. FTC, 15 Shinketsushii
84 (FTC [Decision] No. 2, 1966, Oct. 11, 1968), aff'd on First Appeal, (k~koku), Nakido
K.K. v. FTC. 18 ShinketsushU 214 (Tokyo High Ct., July 17, 1971), aff'd on Second Appeal
(j5koku), 29 Minshu 888 (Sup. Ct. 1st P.B., July 10, 1975); Meiji Sh5ji K.K. v. FTC, 18
Shinketsushii 167 (Tokyo High Ct., July 17, 1971), aff'd on Second Appeal (j6koku), 29
Minshi 951 (Sup. Ct., 2d P.B., July 11, 1975); K.K. Hokkaido Shimbunsha v. FTC, 6
Shinketsush 80 (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 23, 1954), aff'd on Second Appeal (jkoku) 15 Minsh-u
116 (Sup. Ct. 1st P.B., Jan 26, 1961); TSho K.K. v. FTC, 8 Shinketsushii 102 (Sup. Ct., 3rd
P.B., May 25, 1954).
31. K.K. Kosaka Yakkyoku v. Taish5 Seiyaku K.K., 9 Shinketsushii 162 (Tokyo High
Ct., Jan. 22, 1965) (compromised in court); Okawa v. Matsushita Denki Sangy5 K.K., HANM
Jin 20 (No. 863) (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 19, 1977) (held consumers have standing to bring
damage action but dismissed action because of inability to determine amount of damages).
The third case is cited as Kato v. Kansai Slippers Mfg. Co., 2 Keizei Ho 60 (Tokyo High Ct.,
Nov. 24, 1958) in Tanaka and Takeuchi, The Role of Private Persons in the Enforcement of
Law, 7 LAW IN JAPAN 34, 37 n. 10 (1074), dismissing damage action under article 25 of the
Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law for lack of a prior formal FTC decision that there had
been an antitrust violation. This case is not cited, however, in any of the standard reporters.
Two other damage actions are said to be pending. See Rabinowitz, Antitrust in Japan, in
CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BusmNEsS WITH JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 111 (J. Haley ed. 1978).
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tion of unfair business practices, some conclusions can be suggested
at least with respect to two particular vertical restraints: vertical
price-fixing (or resale price maintenance) and exclusive dealing. It
has been against these two restrictive marketing arrangements that
the FTC has directed its most vigorous policing efforts.
Resale Price Maintenance
Resale price maintenance is treated in practice, though not in
theory, as a per se violation of article 19 unless within the exemption
of article 24-2. The applicable provision of the General Designation
is item 8, which lists as an unfair business practice:
Dealing with customers on conditions, which, without good
reason [emphasis added], restrict any transaction between the
said customers and the suppliers of commodities, funds, or other
kinds of economic benefit to them or between the said customers
and any person receiving those from them, or any relationship
between the said customers and their competitors.
Article 24-2, an addition of the 1953 amendments, exempts
manufacturer-imposed resale price maintenance where the product
is of "existing identified uniform quality" (i.e., trademarked goods)
and has been designated for exemption by the FTC.32 The exemp-
tion does not apply if the restraint is "grossly unfair to consumers"
or is employed "against the will" of the manufacturer.3 3 In addition,
article 24-2 precludes the Commission from exempting a product
unless it finds that the product is for the "daily use of consumers
in general" and is sold in a freely competitive market.3 4 There is also
a post-conclusion reporting requirement for price-fixing contracts
covering exempt products."
Although the first formal FTC decision involving resale price
maintenance under article 1931 was not handed down until 1965, 3
32. Article 24-2(1), Article 24-2(4) provides that copyrighted works are exempt without
designation.
33. Id., proviso to article 24-2(1). [The quoted material appears in the OECD translation
but appears as "unduly to injure the interest of the general consumer and contagious to the
will" in the 1978 EHS translation].
34. Id., article 24-2(2)(1) and (2). [This is translated as "daily used by the general
consumer" in the 1978 EHS translation].
35. Id., article 24-2(6).
36. Only three resale price maintenance cases were decided prior to 1953. There are cases
in which resale price maintenance was attacked as an "illegal concerted activity" under old
article 4(1) or an "unreasonable restraint of trade" under article 3. See In re Nakayama
Taiy5d6, 2 Shinketsushii 225 (FTC [Decision] No. 58, 1950, Mar. 15, 1951); In re Hokkaido
Butter K.K., 2 ShinketsushU 103 (FTC [Decision] No. 78, 1950, Sept. 18, 1950). The Hok-
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sixteen of the twenty-six article 19 cases decided thereafter were
directed against its use. 8 In other words, since 1965, prevention of
unauthorized resale price maintenance has been the primary object
of FTC enforcement under article 19.
In theory, resale price maintenance, even when not authorized
under article 24-2, would not be illegal per se. Both the definition
of unfair business practices in article 2(9) and the General Designa-
tion appear to include a Japanese version of the "rule of reason."
No restrictive practice is prohibited outright; all are subject to the
justification that they are imposed for "good reason" or are not
unfair. But if in any instance the FTC has acknowledged the exist-
ence of "good reason" for unauthorized resale price maintenance, it
has not been reported.
More important, the 1975 Supreme Court decisions in the
Wak'dd 9 and Meiji Sh'oji ° cases appear to have effectively ruled out
any economic justification.
In this pair of decisions two petty benches of the Japanese
Supreme Court separately affirmed the tenet that the justification
for a restrictive practice under article 19 must be viewed in terms
of "maintaining a free competitive order." But the ten justices re-
fused to consider or require the FTC to consider the economic argu-
ments presented by the defendants. So long as there is any "fear of
a restraint of trade or obstruction of free competition," the economic
reasonableness of resale price maintenance (and presumably other
restraints) is to be considered irrelevant. Even if reasonable as an
economic or business matter, the justices agreed, that alone is not
sufficient as "good reason" where the competitive freedom of the
other party is restricted." The justices thus seem to say that the
kaido Butter case involved a vertical restriction on dealers; but the latter apparently dealt
with a horizontal agreement among manufacturers, and thus the vertical restriction was
incidental as a policing mechanism for the cartel. As noted above, the K.K. Asahi Shimbun-
sha v. FTC, 4 Shinketsushff 145 (Tokyo High Ct., Mar. 9, 1953), precluded further resort to
either article 3 or 4(1). It appears no attempt was made prior to 1953 to invalidate resale price
maintenance agreements as an unfair method of competition. In addition the FTC did bring
the action against Noda Sh5yu, 9 Shinketsushfi 57 (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 25, 1957), under
the private monopolization provision of article 3. The Noda Shyu case can thus be explained
as an early resale price maintenance case before the FTC had developed the unfair business
practice theory.
37. In re Kao Sekken K.K., 13 Shinketsushu 14 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 6, 1965,
May 20, 1965).
38. The cases are cited at note 22 supra.
39. In re Wak~d6 K.K. v. FTC, 15 Shinketsushui 84 (FTC [Decision] No. 2, 1966, Oct.
11, 1968).
40. In re Meiji Shbji K.K. v. FTC, 15 Shinketsushu 67 (FTC [Decision] No. 1, 1966,
Oct. 11, 1968).
41. 29 MinshU at 894, 980. Although the language used conforms with the thinking of
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FTC may properly condemn any restriction on distributors that has
an adverse impact on competitin-interbrand or intrabrand.
The Wakodo and Meiji Shoji cases arose out of FTC proceed-
ings brought against general distributors affiliated with three of
Japan's largest milk producers, Sanky5 Nyiigy6 K.K., Meiji Nyiigyo
K.K. and Morinaga NyUgy5 K.K.42 The Commission found each
firm in violation of article 19 for having fixed the wholesale and
retail prices of each manufacturer's particular brand of dehydrated
baby formula. Also deemed illegal in each instance was the system
of maintaining a list of registered retailers who separately agreed to
honor the prices set by each defendant and prohibiting wholesalers
from selling to anyone other than a registered retailer. If a retailer
violated the terms of the price agreement, his registration and right
to sell the product could be cancelled. If the wholesaler sold to an
unregistered retailer, rebates or other benefits from the general dis-
tributor or manufacturer could be forfeited. Under prior FTC deci-
sions such arrangements were illegal,43 and the Commission had
little difficulty in reaching a similar result in each of these cases.
Wakod6 and Meiji Sh~ji lost on appeals to the Tokyo High Court
and, as noted, the Supreme Court. Morinaga did not appeal.
The FTC apparently regards the primary evil of resale price
maintenance to be the consequent reduction of price competition
among wholesalers and retailers with respect to a single differen-
tiated product-in other words, the reduction of intrabrand price
competition.44 By treating resale price maintenance as an unfair
business practice per se on this ground, however, the FTC, with the
Supreme Court's sanction, construes the phrase "endanger fair
competition" to cover any practice that has an adverse impact on
competition at any level regardless of how it may ultimately affect
consumers or competition generally.4" This approach is equally ap-
Japan's leading antitrust scholars, none has suggested that economic considerations are to-
tally irrelevant. See, e.g., S. IMAMURA, DOKUSEN KINSHI HO (Antimonopoly Law) 114 (1961);
M. MATSUSHITA, DOKKIN KINSHI HO TO KEIZAI TOSEI (Antimonopoly Law and Economic Regula-
tion) 76-117 (1976); A. SHODA, supra note 13, at 260.
42. The three cases are cited at note 22, supra.
43. See, e.g., In re K.K. Yakult Honsha, 13 ShinketsushU 72 (FTC [Recommendation]
No. 19, 1965, Sept. 13, 1965). Similarly In re Asahi Keito K.K., 13 Shinketsushil 75 (FTC
[Recommendation] No. 20, 1965, Oct. 5, 1965), held illegal and contractual prohibition
against sales to nonmembers of an association in the context of a resale price maintenance
arrangement.
44. See, e.g., KOSEI TORIHIKI I'INKAI, DOKUSEN KINSHI SEIKAKU SANJO-NEN-SHI (History of
Thirty Years of Antimonopoly Policy) 378 (1978).
45. Apparently the Japanese FTC and courts have also been influenced by the American
per se approach to resale price maintenance.
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parent in the FTC's more mixed challenges of exclusive dealing
arrangements.
Exclusive Dealing
The earliest case dealing with an exclusive dealing arrangement
was the 1950 case In re Marukin Sh~yu K.K.45 The principal defen-
dant, a leading Japanese producer of soy sauce, had designated a
Honolulu firm as its exclusive distributor in Hawaii. The distributor
in turn promised not to sell competing products and to purchase
exclusively through Nishi Nippon Beki K.K., a Japanese exporter
and the other defendant in the case. The FTC held this arrangement
illegal under articles 6(1) and 19. Two years later, however, the
Commission expressly repudiated the Marukin decision in reversing
a trial examiner's initial decision against Nihon Kogaku Kogyo
K.K.7 Since 1952 there have been several decisions holding exclu-
sive dealing arrangements to be illegal,48 but none offer much guid-
ance. In the first of two decisions against Taish5 Seiyaku K.K.,5 for
instance, the Commission distinguished the Nihon Kdgaku K~gy5
case on the grounds that the restriction in the latter case was im-
posed on only one party whereas in creating a network of chain
stores Taish5 Seiyaku had entered into exclusive dealing arrange-
ments with over four thousand dealers. The Commission expressed
particular concern that other pharmaceutical manufacturers were
establishing similar chain store systems, with the consequence, the
Commisson asserted without elucidation, of limiting competition.
No other cases were brought and left unanswered was Taish- Sei-
yaku's argument that since there were many other manufacturers
and tens of thousands of resale outlets, its arrangements would not
appreciably affect competition. 0
The leading case in this area remains the HokkaidU
Shimbunsha case.-" The defendant was the publisher of the leading
local newspaper in Hokkaid6 with a 56 percent share of the market
46. Cited at note 23, supra.
47. In re Nihon K~gaku K~gy5 K.K., 4 Shinketsushfi 30 (FTC [Decision] No. 55, 1950,
Sept. 3, 1952).
48. See cases cited at note 23, supra.
49. Both decisions are cited at note 23, supra.
50. In the first case, Taish5 Seiyaku had only required members of the chain to promote
sale of its products and not to join another chain. The second case dealt with contractual
obligations not to handle any competing products at all. Violation would result in termination
of chain store status and loss or reduction of rebates.
51. In re K.K. Hokkaid5 Shimbunsha, 5 Shinketsush-u 5 (FTC [Decision] No. 9, 1951,
May 18, 1953).
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in the prefecture and 46 percent in Sapporo, the largest city. The
case arose in the context of intense rivalry between Hokkaido
Shimbun, published only in the morning, and its principal local
competitor the Hokkai Times, which had only an evening edition.
When both began to appear in morning and evening editions, the
publishers began aggressive campaigns to pressure dealers to handle
only one of the two papers. As one might expect, the leading paper,
Hokkaid6 Shimbun, was the more successful and the FTC stepped
in.
The Commission found that Hokkaid5 Shimbunsha had vio-
lated article 19 of the Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law in de-
manding that dealers that had theretofor sold both papers not sell
the Hokkai Times. Those who refused had their contracts termi-
nated. Hokkaid6 Shimbunsha lost on appeals in both the Tokyo
High Court and the Supreme Court."
Both courts upheld the FTC on the basis of the substantial
evidence rule,5 3 the Supreme Court noting without further explana-
tion that, while exclusive distributorship agreements were in them-
selves not illegal, the Commission had properly condemned the ac-
tions by Hokkaid6 Shimbunsha.4
The import of these decisions is perhaps best summarized in
the FTC's Guidelines on Sole Import Distributorship Agreements.
The Guidelines affirm the general validity of exclusive dealing
agreements, absent other disfavored restrictions (such as resale
price maintenance). " The Hokkaido Shimbunsha decisions are es-
52. Id.
53. Articles 80 and 82(1) of the Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law limits the scope of
judicial review on direct appeal (but not in a private action for damages) to the substantial
evidence test.
54. 15 Minsh-u at 119.
55. The Sole Import Distributorship Guidelines Announcement (Nov. 21, 1972) provide:
"1. Among the restrictions which are likely to constitute unfair business prac-
tices in continuous import and sale agreements including sole import distributor-
ship agreements, the following are outstanding:
(1) To restrict the resale prices of the goods covered by an agreement.
(2) To restrict the persons to whom the goods covered by an agreement are
resold.
(3) To impose the obligation to purchase parts, etc., for the goods covered by
an agreement from the foreign party or a person designated by such foreign party.
Provided, that this provision is not applicable to the case where the foreign party
requires on reasonable grounds that the domestic party stock a certain quantity of
parts, etc., for example, s6 that the domestic party can adequately meet the de-
mand of the consumers for repair parts, etc.
(4) To unduly hinder parallel importation of the goods covered by the agree-
ment.
(5) To impose an unduly disadvantageous condition for the termination of the
agreement.
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sentially summarized in the provisions of item 6 that proscribe any
restrictions on dealing with competitive goods that are being han-
dled by the distributor at the time the contract is concluded.
As in the case of resale price maintenance, one detects here too
a willingness on the part of the FTC to condemn restrictions that
curtail existing competition in any way, regardless of their ultimate
impact. In two more recent cases, In re MutO KogyU K.K. and In re
Pijon K.K., the FTC did challenge the exclusive dealings agree-
ments where the distributors had not handled competing goods
prior to the arrangement. These cases clearly go beyond both the
Supreme Court's holding in the HokkaidU Shim bunsha case and the
FTC's own guidelines. Both, however, involved resale price mainte-
nance and may be distinguished on that ground.
(6) To restrict manufacturing, using or selling goods competitive with those
covered by the agreements. Provided, that this shall not include the case where the
domestic party has been granted an exclusive license to sell and he is not restricted
from manufacturing, using or selling those goods which he has already been manu-
facturing, using or selling.
2. In case the parties to the sole import distributorship agreement are in a
competitive position with each other with respect to the goods covered by the
agreement or the same kind, and if the domestic party would come to occupy either
25 percent or larger share or the largest share in the domestic market for the goods
covered by the agreement or the same kind as a result of the agreement, such
agreement is likely to constitute an unfair business practice: Provided, that this
shall not apply where, in the light of such competitive conditions in the industry
concerned and economic conditions regarding the agreement and the goods covered
by the agreement it is considered that there is no likelihood of hindering fair compe-
tftion. Conditions to be taken into account include the following:
(1) The business capacity of the parties and competitors;
(2) The circumstances of distribution of the goods concerned.
(3) The circumstances regarding new entry into the industry and its degree
of difficulty; and
(4) Competition with Substitute goods. For the purpose of this paragraph, the
term "parties" include their affiliated companies, namely companies whose man-
agement is substantially controlled by such parties (subsidiaries, sub-subsidiaries,
etc.), companies which substantially control the management of such parties (par-
ent companies, etc.) and companies whose management is substantially controlled
by a common parent company (affiliated companies, etc.)
3. Depending on the actual circumstances the preceding two paragraphs shall
apply mutatis mutandis to an agreement between a domestic party and a foreign
party, under which the domestic party is to handle goods on consignment, or act
as intermediary." FTC Recommendation No. , 1972. See Matushita, supra
note 23, at 68-78.
The most recent FTC cases on exclusive dealing have also involved resale price mainte-
nance. In re Mut K6gyU K.K., supra notes 22, 23; In re Dijon K.K., supra notes 22, 23; In
re France Bed K.K., supra notes 22, 23.
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The Itten Itchiai System Cases
On November 28, 1977, the FTC handed down formal decisions
in three separate cases again involving sale of dehydrated baby
formula against Yukijirushi NyUigy5 K.K. (Snow Brand Milk Prod-
ucts), 6 Meiji Nyfigyo K.K. (Meiji Milk Products)57 and Morinaga
Nyfigy- K.K. (Morinaga Milk Products), 8 the three leading dairy
product manufacturers in Japan. At the time the FTC commenced
the cases, the three firms had a combined share of 94% of the market
for dehydrated baby formula (Meiji led with 46%, followed by Snow
Brand with 30% and Morinaga with 18%). In each case the Commis-
sion determined that the companies had committed unfair business
practices in requiring retailers to purchase their product from desig-
nated wholesalers and employing various payments schemes to en-
force the restrictions. Each of the three defendants had put into
effect a marketing arrangement referred to in Japanese as the itten
itchai ("single store, single-account-entry") system whereby retail-
ers are required to purchase from a single designated wholesaler and
wholesalers are similarly obligated to sell only to a specific group of
retailers. It is one of the more typical arrangements being used by
manufacturers to control and simplify marketing channels. 9
Two of the defendants (Snow Brand and Meiji) enforced this
form of systemetized distribution through an arrangement involving
add-on payments to be repaid by the manufacturer. Their retailers
were required to add a percentage of their marginal profit to the
wholesale price of the product. The wholesaler would pay this
amount to the manufacturer, which would make direct periodic
repayments to the retailers. A similar arrangement applied to who-
lesalers. If either a retailer or wholesaler violated the terms of the
distribution restriction, he would forfeit all or a part of a payment.
Presumably because of a weaker bargaining position, the other de-
fendant (Morinaga) sold its product on consignment, although in
practice wholesalers dealt with retailers in their own names. Para-
doxically, it seems sales to wholesalers and retailers were made
ostensibly on credit, at least the distribution contracts with the
56. In re Yukijirusbi Ny-ugyU K.K., 24 Shinketsushu , NBL (No. 153) (FTC Deci-
sion) No. 2, 1974, Nov. 28, 1977).
57. In re Meiji Nyugy K.K., 74 Shinketsushi -, NBL (No. 152) (FTC [Decision]
No. 3, 1974, Nov. 28, 1977).
58. In re Morinaga Nyigy5 K.K., 24 Shinketsush-u 37, NBL (No. 154) (FTC [Decision]
No. 4, 1974, Nov. 28, 1977).
59. See Kawagoe, Rylitsii keiretsuka to dokkin seisaku (Channelization of Distribution
and Antitrust Policy) Juisuwo 95 (No. 678) (1977).
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manufacturer included an acceleration clause activated in the event
of violation of any provision, including the customer restriction.
The FTC found each of the defendants guilty of unfair business
practices under the General Designation and thus in violation of
article 19 of the Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law. The itten
itchai marketing system was found to come under item 8 and the
enforcement schemes, item 10 of the General Designation. The
Commission ordered each defendant to eliminate the restrictions
and so to advise their wholesalers and retailers."0
Left unanswered-perhaps purposefully-are questions regard-
ing the scope and applicability of the decisions. Does the Commis-
sion's emphasis on the market share of the three defendants indi-
cate, for reasons stated that similarly restricted channels of distri-
bution will not be considered illegal unless in an oligopolistic
market?" Exercising its new powers under the 1977 amendments,
the FTC has already indicated that 26 fields, including dairy prod-
ucts, are in a "state of monopoly" (dokusen-teki jitai),2 Does this
mean that customer and supplier restrictions in the distribution of
these products are illegal?
A cautious reading of the decisions leads to the conclusion that
they may be resale price maintenance cases in another guise. The
cases were essentially a continuation of the earlier Meiji Shoji,
Morinaga and Wak~dU cases, although only two of the decisions in
each set involved the same parties. And there is some evidence, at
least in the initial decisions by the trial examiner, that the FTC
viewed the itten itch5ai system as a mechanism by which manufac-
turers were enforcing resale price maintenance. 3 Indeed, in six prior
60. This summary is based on the facts found in initial decisions (shinketsuan) by the
FTC trial examiners. NBL (No. 152) 45, NBL (No. 152) 57, NBL (No. 154) (57).
61. Under a literal reading, item 8 of the general designation supra p. 4 would apply to
similar restrictions regardless of how oligopolistic the industry might be. Moreover, since
efficiencies or other economic benefits to the public will not apparently be considered as a
defense, presumably the FTC will not have to show economic harm, thus there would seem
to be no reason for the FTC to limit the prohibition to oligopolistic markets. The Commis-
sion's formal decisions in these cases do not refer to the market share of the defendants.
However, there is considerable emphasis on this factor in the trial examiners' initial decisions.
See, e.g., In re Yukijirushi Ny-igyB K.K., NBL (No. 153) at 46. See also Negishi, Rylits'i
keiretsuka o meguru dokkin hZ-jo no mondaiten (I) (Problems Relating to the Channelization
of Distribution Under the Antimonopoly Law), NBL 7 (No. 158) (1978).
62. In addition to dairy products, they are: monosodium glutonate, salad dressing, beer,
whiskey, instant coffee, synthetic fiber, calcium cyanamide, rayon filament, color film, plate
glass, heavy rails, ball bearings, tinplate, cast iron pipe, cans, farm tractors, heavy construc-
tion equipment, electric tools, communication equipment (e.g., telephones), radio and televi-
sion equipment, automobiles, motorcycles, wrist watches, clocks, pianos. Nihon Keizai
Shimbun (Japan Economics Newspaper) Nov. 29, 1977, at 2 (evening ed.).
63. In re Morinaga Nyugy6 K.K., NBL (No. 154) at 51-52; In re Yukijirushi Nyugy5
K.K., NBL (No. 153) at 50; In re Meiji Nyuigy5 K.K., NBL (No. 152) at 58. See also K6sEi
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decisions the FTC had questioned similar customer and supplier
restrictions on these grounds.
The first were the three Dairitenkai (association of sales agen-
cies) cases in which the defendant associations agreed to the Com-
mission's recommendation that they had fixed resale prices. 4 These
cases also involved a form of the itten itch~ai system except that the
members could purchase from two wholesalers. The FTC did not,
however, require the associations to cease using the customer-
supplier restrictions. The next case was In re Nihon K6gaku KdgyU
K.K.65 The manufacturer had adopted a restricted dealer system in
connection with resale price maintenance. The FTC held the resale
price maintenance arrangement to be illegal but again did not re-
quire the defendant to eliminate the customer-supplier restrictions,
although it did order the defendant to withdraw instructions advis-
ing wholesalers and retailers whom to sell to or buy from. The fifth
case was In re Gunze.6 Gunze had organized its distributors into
regional "Gunze associations" and prohibited each member from
making wholesale purchases or sales except from other members.
The FTC deemed this to come under item 8 of the General Designa-
tion in violation of article 19. It was viewed, however, as a mecha-
nism to enforce resale price maintenance. A sixth case, In re
Hakugen,7 was decided after the trial proceedings commenced in
the dehydrated baby formula cases but before the decision. Haku-
gen, a leading manufacturer of toilet articles, violated article 19, the
FTC held, in designating to wholesalers the resale price of its prod-
ucts and the retailers to whom they could sell. The latter was
treated, however, as an independent issue.
Given the Commission's limited investigatory powers s and the
difficulties of proving an agreement to maintain prices in the Japa-
nese setting, the FTC would welcome a policing approach that re-
duces the problems of proof. It also is reasonable to assume that the
affected retailers and wholesalers would be more willing to complain
ToRIHIKI I'INKAI, supra note 44 at 378, in which resale price maintenance is listed as the
primary evil of such marketing restrictions.
64. In re Tanoshii Shugei no Hamanaka Dairitenkai, 16 Shinketsushii 10 (FTC
[Recommendation] No. 4, April 18, 1969); In re Tanoshii Shugei no Kansai Dairitenkai, 16
ShinketsushFU 17 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 5, April, 18, 1969); In re Tanoshii Shugei no
Kyushu Dairitenkai, 16 SinketsushU 23 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 6, 1969, April 18,
1969).
65. 19 Sinketsushu- 25 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 7, 1972, June 30, 1972).
66. 23 Shinketsushi - (FTC [Recommendation] No. 3, 1976, June 14, 1976).
67. 23 Sinketsush-u - (FTC [Recommendation] No. 11, 1976, Oct. 8, 1976).
68. See Haley, Antitrust in Japan: Problems of Enforcement, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS
OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST AsA 121-25 (J. Haley ed. 1978).
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to the FTC about restrictions on the parties with whom they could
do business than about resale price maintenance since they would
have more to gain from the latter than the former.69 The Commis-
sion could have also perceived that since retailers had no choice as
to which wholesalers to purchase from there must be some degree
of control by the manufacturer over at least wholesale prices. Conse-
quently, these cases may turn out to be isolated decisions that re-
flect continuing FTC concern with retail price maintenance and
only secondarily customer and other marketing restrictions, but,
like the prior cases on exclusive dealings, lack a consistent and
coherent policy or doctrine.
A broader-and more troubling-view of the cases is to see
them as the first of a series of proceedings against various forms of
manufacturer-controlled marketing systems. That the Commission
brought separate actions challenging the itten itchbai system iso-
lated from resale price maintenance lends support to this view.
By definition the itten itchoai system precludes competition at
the wholesale level. Thus, given the concern with any restriction of
competition that seems to underlie past FTC decisions with respect
to both resale price maintenance and exclusive dealings, it is subject
to FTC attack. Yet it is not clear that these restrictions affect con-
sumers or competition at the retail level adversely. Quite the con-
trary, it can at least be argued that the marketing efficiencies
achieved are apt to enhance at least interbrand competition and
benefit the consumer by making it easier for new entrants to organ-
ize marketing channels, and encouraging greater promotional activ-
ities, services and other forms of nonprice competition. Moreover,
the immediate impact of insulating wholesalers from competition is
to reduce their need for high profit margins, a cost savings that can
be passed directly to retailers and the ultimate buyers. In short, an
extension of the per se approach or the Wak~dd and Meiji Sh~ji
cases to this area is difficult to justify.70
One explanation of this foray by the FTC is a misperceived
concern over the independence of small business enterprises. The
Commission lists the loss of economic independence of wholesalers
69. This is evidenced at least to some extent by the fact that there have been nearly as
many cases of resale price maintenance by trade associations or other horizontal agreements
as manufacturer-imposed resale price maintenance. See, e.g., the cases cited in Tsuji, supra
note 12.
70. For a forceful summary of the variety of possible economic benefits of vertical re-
straints and the disadvantages of a per se rule, see the opinion by Justice Powell for the
majority in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See also R.
BoRK, THE ANTrrRusT PARADox 280-309 (1978); E. GELLHORN, ANTrrRusT LAW AND ECONOMICS
250-95 (1976).
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and retailers and the enhancement of the bargaining position of
manufacturers relative to their distributors as two of the principal
evils of such customer restrictions.7' Having expressly accepted
Wak~dS's rejection of any economic justification for the restrictions,
in effect the FTC has chosen in these cases to protect the independ-
ence of existing wholesale and retail establishments at the expense
of any economic efficiencies that might benefit the consumer. It
would be ironic, however, for the FTC to move in this direction. The
likely effect of FTC efforts to prevent manufacturers from organiz-
ing existing retailers and wholesalers will be to expand use of
manufacturer-owned outlets, franchise chains and large scale mer-
chandizers (such as the "super") at the expense of those the Com-
mission seeks to shelter.
The other evils the FTC apparently associates with such mar-
keting arrangements are equally ironic. The Commission has argued
that such restrictions may operate as a barrier to new entrants and
reduce promotion, offer sales service and other forms of nonprice
competition. 72 Yet in most instances, as noted above, these are
among their principal justifications. 3
In any event, over the next two years the most interesting devel-
opments in Japanese antitrust regulation are likely to take place in
this area.
71. K-SEI TORIHIKI I'INKAI, supra note 44, at 378.
72. Id. See also, Itoda, Ryutsu keiretsuka to dokkinh'o no unyo (Channelization of Distri-
bution and the Trend of Antimonopoly Law) 126-27 (M. Matsushita ed. 1978).
73. The cases have met with unusually strong criticism in Japan. See, e.g,, Negishi,
supra note 61. The second and concluding part of the article appears in NBL 37 (No. 161)
(1978). Kurusu, Dokkinh5 ni yoru ryatsu keiretsuka kisei no shintenkai (New Developments
in the Regulation of Channelization of Distribution Under the Antimonopoly Law), in KXsF
TommKi 24 (No. 327) 2 (No. 328), 11 (No. 329), 7 (No. 331), 32 (No. 332) (1978).
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